1 Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are commonly used in industries such as oil and natural gas, transportation, electric, water and wastewater, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, as well as discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) SCADA systems are generally used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and supervisory control.
Introduction
Consider the typical ICS architecture for a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, which relies on an Internet that often uses wireless technologies. In such architectures these systems are more vulnerable to the new security challenges including internal and external cyber-attacks. ICS security objectives typically follow the priority of availability and integrity, followed by confidentiality. Some of the possible incidents may include: i) Blocked or delayed flow of data through ICS networks disrupting ICS operation; ii) Unauthorized changes to instructions, commands, or alarm thresholds damaging, disabling or shutting down equipment causing environmental impacts and affecting safety; iii) Inaccurate "spoofed" information may be sent to operators to disguise unauthorized changes and/or cause operators to initiate inappropriate actions leading to various negative effects (e.g., unavailability); iv) Software or configuration settings may be modified by malware leading to similar negative effects. There are a myriad of disruptive scenarios that could negatively impact the operation and/or availability of equipment protection systems, endanger costly and difficult-toreplace equipment, as well as safety systems that would endanger human life. Four brief examples of SCADA security incidents include [1] [2] [3] [4] :
-In 2000, a disgruntled employee, gained unauthorized access into a compromised management system in Australia. As a consequence, millions of liters of raw sewage spilled into local parks and rivers while both pumps and warning alarms failed.
-In 2006, an overload of network traffic caused a number of reactor recirculation pumps to fail in the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama, USA.
-In 2009, both Chinese and Russian spies penetrated the US electric power grid leaving behind disruptive malware using network-mapping tools.
-In 2010, the Stuxnet worm was detected. It was the first worm known to attack SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems.
Such key critical infrastructures, of which SCADA systems form the core, need to be available at all times. Continuous availability requires strong measureable security processes to protect against cyber-attacks.
Related Approaches to this Work
Organizations typically implement a focused risk management process to identify and mitigate risks and assure their organizational missions. Managing those risks requires an integrated approach to: identify, deter, detect, and prepare for threats and hazards to national critical infrastructure; reduce vulnerabilities of critical assets, systems, and networks; and mitigate the potential consequences to adverse events [5] . Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, builds on the extensive work done to date to protect critical infrastructure, and identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors.
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) has generated an inventory of risk management and risk assessment methods [6] . A total of 13 methods were considered. Each method in the inventory has been described through a template. The template used consists of 21 attributes describing characteristics of a method. The inventory also provides for the comparison of the risk management methods and also the risk management tools [7] .
Boehm et al., [8] discuss the nature of information system dependability and highlight the variability of system dependability afforded to stakeholders; the dependency patterns of their model are subsequently analyzed in [9] to determine how and to what extent it addresses the issues raised by [8] in regards to the Stakeholder/Value definition of system dependability described in [10] .
Herein we include an overview of SCADA systems (Section II). Section III introduces the risk assessment process to enhance the security of SCADA systems. We then present the mean failure cost (MFC) metric as a measure for security (Section IV). Section V illustrates a real example taken from a utility in Tunisia. Section VI focuses the generic concept of mean failure cost to the specific quest of measuring availability for SCADA systems (Section VII). We conclude by describing this proposed measure and discussing some differences with more common formulations.
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RISK ASSESSMENT FOR . . .
SCADA Systems Background
The IEEE standard C37. 1-2007 [11] defines SCADA as a system operating with coded signals over communication channels so as to provide control of remote terminal units (RTU) equipment. The supervisory system may be combined with a data acquisition system by adding the use of coded signals over communication channels to acquire information about the status of the RTU equipment for display or for recording functions.
SCADA Architecture
The SCADA system consists of several components that communicate with each other as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Based on several studies such as those described by Igure [12] and Hentea [13] -SCADA network segment: containing servers, workstations, Human Machine Interface (HMI) and data historian(s), among others.
-Field devices segment: containing three types of fields, namely programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units (RTUs) and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).
Software SCADA Components
The software components combine [12, 13] :
-Protocols: some of these protocols are common and found in general ICT which are TCP and UDP, while some are unique and only found within specific industrial settings, such as CIP, Modbus, Fieldbus, DNP3 and PROFIBUS.
-Operating systems: current SCADA systems use commonly Windows and the older Windows NT software.
SCADA Communication Components
As discussed in [12, 13] , communication links utilize:
-Physical connections: include optical fiber, radio, satellite, etc. SCADA are typically connected to the Internet through a gateway.
-Logical connection: SCADA typically use standard logical network topologies, which circulate data through physical links. 
Security Issues on SCADA System
Availability, integrity and confidentiality (listed in priority order; usually referred to, in an IT context, as CIA reverse order) are the core requirements for cyber-physical security. Security professionals and students commonly refer to these three fundamental principles of security as the CIA triad. Based on an extensive literature analysis, the Information Assurance & Security (IAS) Octave has been developed and proposed as an extension of the CIA-triad [14] . The IAS Octave includes confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, authenticity & trustworthiness, nonrepudiation, accountability and auditability. The importance of security requirements depends on the nature/role of the system. The requirements in SCADA systems are different and focus on health, safety, environment factors and operational availability/reliability. As shown in Table 1 , the availability and integrity of information in SCADA systems are ranked ordered as number one and two in this regard. SCADA systems impose deterministic hard real time response requirements with fixed constrained on maximum communication time making them more vulnerable to disruption [1] .
Connecting SCADA systems to the Internet or corporate Networks (one step removed) with-out taking appropriate security measures creates an easy target and introduces many security risks. This is especially true because designing-in security and authentication protocols into SCADA has been considered unnecessary up until the recent past. Such legacy deployments have relied on the obscurity/anonymity of specialized protocols and proprietary interfaces as well as physical isolation [15] . Readily available rootkits that can subvert/exploit, for example, Windows or other platform for that matter, have made obscurity untenable. Such tools have become very sophisticated (e.g., Stuxnet) while at the same time lowered the skill-level and time needed to launch an attack. Other problems such as increasing complexity and interdependence of critical infrastructures [16] , include the risks from loss of service (e.g., electricity, traffic or process control), financial sector services, property and environment damage, and potential loss of life [17] .
Cyber Vulnerabilities in SCADA Systems
SCADA systems have many security vulnerabilities as described in [12] . The increasing interconnectivity of SCADA networks has exposed them to a wide range of network security vulnerabilities including those related to hardware, software, communication links or user authorization: -Hardware vulnerabilities: Different SCADA components (i.e., SCADA master, RTUs and IEDs) address these vulnerabilities in specific ways. For example, RTUs have low processing power as well as limited persistent and working memory [18] .
-Software vulnerabilities: The most common SCADA software vulnerabilities deal with disruption, data traffic interception and modification. Software can be removed intentionally by an attacker to cause a potentially serious failure [19] . Other vulnerabilities are related to operating system/firewall security [20] . The problem occurs because many nodes on SCADA systems run real-time operating systems (RTOS). These systems are more susceptible to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks compared with regular operating systems because even minor disruptions in messaging can lead to a significant loss of system availability as a consequence of this type of deterministic hard real-time operations [21] . Additionally, there are problems related to the lack of authentication and nonrepudiation mechanisms in older protocols used in these systems (Modbus or e.g., Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol [ICCP]) [12] resulting in lower resiliency to disruptive attacks. Simpler protocols are often preferred over more complex mechanisms for improved reliability, maintainability and performance.
-Communication links vulnerabilities: Phone systems may be used as means of connection to the outside world. As noted in [22] , problems occur since these types of gateways likely do not include requisite security features.
-Authorization vulnerabilities: A common theme in the industry is the fear that unauthorized access to equipment may deny legitimate access to a user or other resource demands, causing failure of these systems to become unavailable or to operate unreliably (less responsively) as it is supposed to [23, 24] . Unauthorized access can also alter control logics or upload a zero line control code to destroy the system [20] .
These vulnerabilities provide the opportunity for attackers to easily SCADA systems via mechanisms such as: -Hacker can intrude, modify, destroy or exfiltrate data thereby causing disruption to systems and networks [17, 22] and/or DoS.
-Malware (i.e., viruses, worms, Trojans and spyware) may act on behalf of hackers causing much the same effects albeit less intelligently but perhaps less invasively waiting for the right time to exfiltrate, disrupt or corrupt data and/or communications (installation via back doors or key loggers representing hidden functionality [17, 23] which may be delivered via firmware updates). Current research is ongoing toward ensuring that no hidden functionality is delivered in hardware scoured from "trusted" vendors.
-Human accidental errors can have the same impact as malicious attacks [13] whose effects may -DoS is a difficult/resource intensive attack to defend. In SCADA, legitimate devices and services are prevented or refused access to needed resources that ultimately disrupt the proper functioning of network based control systems. These are discrete-time, linear dynamic systems where control and measurement packets are transmitted over a linked network. The packets may be jammed or compromised by a malicious adversary.
-Malicious cyber attacks to control systems can be classified as either deception or DoS attacks. In the context of control systems, integrity refers to the trustworthiness of sensor and control data packets. A lack of integrity results in deception: when a component receives false data and believes it to be true (e.g., an incorrect measurement, time stamp, or sender identity). On the other hand, availability of a control system refers to the ability of all components to being accessible [12, 25] .
In the control and verification community there is a significant body of work on networked control, stochastic system verification, robust control, and fault-tolerant control [25] aimed at intrinsically (built-in) protecting or deferring malicious deception/DoS attacks. The more added-on type of security control measures includes typical ICT security measures (cryptographic techniques, passwords, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, virtual private network, antivirus, access control, etc.) [1, 12, 13, 21, 26] . Moreover, other SCADA measures have been proposed: first embodied in IEEE/ISO standards [11] and NIST Guidelines [27] , and secondly enhancing SCADA protocols by placing at each end of the communication media encryption and decryption technologies, wrapping SCADA protocols without making changes to the protocols using external cryptographic and security protocols (SSL/TLS, IPSec) or modifying the protocols fundamentally [1, 25] . A significant challenge, however, is the decision about which of these measures is the appropriate mechanisms considering risk, impact and cost. Still, these techniques do not address quantifying the likelihood of success (and impact) of those diverse sets of security threats.
When quantifying risks to the organization let's not forget to include brand damage, loss of revenue, share price reduction and in severe cases within the context of cyber physical, loss of life [26] . The reality of the aforementioned threats (Section I, Items 1-4) has emerged over the past several decades [1] [2] [3] [4] . While SCADA systems were originally designed to be closed systems, the number of systems driving physical infrastructure connected to the Internet and interlinked with other systems is increasing each year [28] . From these limits derive the need to develop pertinent threat and risk modeling approaches. A threat/risk model can help to assess the probability, the potential harm, the priority of attacks, and thus help to minimize or eradicate the threats and needed to formalize the perceived risk [21, 29] .
Risk Assessments
Decades ago, security of the first and second generations of SCADA systems were overlooked because of vendor-proprietary environments. Cyber attackers exploiting publicly known information security vulnerabilities breached those air-gapped SCADA systems when SCADA systems were first connected to the Internet. Most vulnerabilities, such as vulnerabilities of operating systems, offthe-shelf applications and communication protocols have been patched in IT systems. Therefore, the first step to enhance security of SCADA systems is to mitigate risks of known threats and vulnerabilities by producing and implementing recommendations of security controls and alternative solutions periodically [27, 30, 31] .
Due to the limitation of resources, organizations need to compare the cost of implementing security controls and solutions with the losses of cyber attacks before they implement the recommended security controls. As shown in Formula (1), cyber security risk is a function of the probability of a given threat source exploiting known vulnerabilities and the resulting impact of a successful exploitation of the vulnerability [27] :
To manage risks of SCADA systems, an iterative and continuous risk management cycle including risk framing, risk assessment, risk responses, and risk monitoring can be structured [32] .
-Risk Framing: this element describes environment in which recommended security controls and alternative solutions are made. In this step organizations make assumptions about threats, vulnerabilities, impacts, and the probability (likelihood) of occurrence. After that, organizations should identify their constraints and the level of acceptable risks. Trust relationships and trade-offs between different types of risks must be identified as well [33, 34] .
-Risk Assessment: similar to the risk assessment for IT systems [32] , this element is for SCADA systems to identify threats, vulnerabilities, impact and probability.
-The first step of this element is to define the scoop of effort. In this step, the SCADA system boundaries are identified. Systemrelated information such as hardware, software, system interfaces is collected. System functions and system/data criticality and sensitivity are identified as well.
-The second step is to identify the potential threat-sources to successfully exercise vulnerabilities. The SCADA system's threat statement (the list of potential threat-sources) will be tailored to its environment.
-The third step is to identify SCADA system vulnerabilities. In this step vulnerability sources associated with threats and security requirements checklists are generated. System security testing is a proactive method to identify the system vulnerabilities.
-The fourth step is to analyze the security controls that have been implemented or are planned for implemented. Therefore, the overall probability (or likelihood) rating that a potential vulnerability would be exercised by threats can be derived in step five.
-The sixth step is to determining the adverse impact (loss of availability, integrity, and confidentiality) resulting from the compromised system by potential threats. The magnitude of impact is determined by this step as well.
-The seventh step is to assess the level of risk to the SCADA system using Formula (1). The output of this step is the risk level (i.e., high, medium, and low).
-Risk Response: this element provides risk responses to address SCADA system risks once that risk are assessed [33, 34] . Considering the effectiveness of recommended options, legislation and regulation, organizational policy, operational impact, and safety and reliability [32] , the recommended security controls and alternative solutions could be evaluated. This element also recommends the organization to accept, avoid, mitigate or transfer risks based on the results of risk assessment.
-Risk Monitoring: this element monitors that security controls have been implemented. It also verifies that overall SCADA system risks have been reduced to an acceptable level by implementing recommended controls. Any changes that impact risk to the SCADA system are identified as well. In addition, proposed monitoring processes to assess the risk and its response are defined.
Mean Failure Cost (MFC) as a Measure of Security
In [35] , the concept of Mean Failure Cost (MFC) was first introduced. The concept was refined through a series of applications [21, 36, 37] and has been applied to several domains which include mission assurance [38, 39] , failure impact analysis in Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [40, 41] , risk assessment [42, 43] , game theoretic simulation [40, 44] , cybersecurity modeling in the cloud [45] , and SCADA environments [46, 47] . This value-based metric (MFC), when applied quantifies the security of a computing system by the statistical mean of the random variable that represents for each stakeholder, the amount of loss that results from security threats and system vulnerabilities. Unlike other dependability measures which are intrinsic to the system, MFC depends not only on the system but also on the stakeholder, and takes into account the variance of the stakes that a stakeholder has in meeting each security requirement. MFC can be extended beyond security to capture other aspects of dependability, such as reliability, availability, safety, since it makes no distinction about what causes the potential loss. Furthermore, whereas other dependability models distinguish between several levels of severity in security failures, we have no need for such a classification since the cost associated with each requirement violation provides a way to quantify potential loss over a continuum. The MFC can be computed by means of the following formula:
Where,
-ST: The stakes matrix filled by stakeholders according to the stakes they have in satisfying individual requirements. It is composed of the list of stakeholders and the list of security requirements. Each cell expressed in dollars (i.e., monetary terms) and it represents loss incurred and/or premium placed on the specific requirement.
-ST (H i ,): Is the stake that stakeholders H i has in meeting requirement R j .
-DP: The dependency matrix is filled in by the system architect (i.e., cyber security operations and system administrators) according to how each component contributes to meet each requirement; each cell represents probability of failure with respect to a requirement given that a component has failed.
-DP (R j , C k ): The probability that the system fails to meet requirement R j if component C k is compromised.
-IM: The impact matrix is filled by analysts according to how each component is affected by each threat; each cell represents probability of compromising a component given that a threat has materialized, it depends on the target of each threat, likelihood of success of the threat.
-IM (C k , T h ): The probability that Component C k is compromised if Threat T h has materialized.
-PT: The vector of threats characterizes the threat situation by assigning to each threat category the probability that that threat will materialize over a unitary period of operation time.
-P(Ti): The probability that threat Ti materialized within a unit of operation time.
5 Quantifying Security: The STEG Case Study
Herein we assessed a full-scale enterprise SCADA system within the domain of an electric power utility. We studied the case of the Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas (STEG: Socit Tunisienne de l'Electricit et du Gaz) [47] .
STEG's role is to develop and maintain the country's natural gas network, thus realizing the electrification and associated natural gas infrastructure. The case study analyzed service delivery and associated administrative controls for electric power flow during a one-year study period. All necessary data, including security requirements, stakeholders, components and the various threats (and actual attacks) were collected by interviewing STEG Managers/Subject Matter Experts. The information collected was used to parameterize the MFC model.
The Stakes Matrix (ST)
We populated the Stakes Matrix (Table 2 ) from data collected via interviewing the security team. Each cell is monetized in terms of dollars ($USD) and represents the loss and/or premium placed on a given requirement.
The stakeholders of SCADA
To simplify the analysis, we consolidated the stakeholders into 4 categories: -Maintenance personnel and operational personnel responsible for the maintenance and the performance of all system operations.
-System administrators responsible for the administration of SCADA system.
-Technical staff responsible for installing software and ancillary materials on the system.
-Controllers of SCADA serving a vital role in maintaining the safe and efficient systems operation (e.g. quality assurance/control).
SCADA security requirements of the STEG Utility
We considered the security requirements concerns that are often cited in the SCADA systems: -Integrity -Availability -Confidentiality -Authenticity Table 2 provides represented the populated Stakes Matrix with the Stakeholders and their respective security requirements.
The Dependency (DP) Matrix
The dependency (DP) matrix presented in Table 3 is populated by cyber security operations and system administrators according to how each component contributes to meet each requirement.
The components of system
To populate this matrix we used the values provided via interviews with STEG: 
The Impact Matrix (IM)
The impact matrix (IM) presented in Table 4 is populated, through an interview process using subject matter experts (SME). Each cell contains the estimated probability that a component becomes compromised given that a threat has materialized. Naturally, the likelihood of a successful compromise depends on the resiliency of a given target. Though this dependency is not denoted separately in mathematical terms, the interview process is designed to take into account the condition (resiliency) of the target. In other words, the likelihood determination process should elicit and account for the existence of known vulnerabilities and other architectural features and/or dependencies that may cause coincident failure at the target. A coincident failure is when the target component is affected indirectly by other failed components. The SME must decide during an interview, for example, what is the likelihood that a DoS attack would affect a given target component including any residual effects from a DoS attack on neighboring coincident target components. Those residual effects Table 2 . Stakes (ST) matrix for SCADA System Table 3 . The dependency (DP) matrix for the SCADA System Table 2 . Stakes (ST) matrix for SCADA System Table 3 . The dependency (DP) matrix for the SCADA System Table 4 . The Impact Matrix (IM) for the SCADA System during a one-year study period. All necessary data, including security requirements, stakeholders, components and the various threats (and actual attacks) were collected by interviewing STEG Managers/Subject Matter Experts. The information collected was used to parameterize the MFC model.
The Stakes Matrix (ST)
We populated the Stakes Matrix (Table II) from data collected via interviewing the security team. Each cell is monetized in terms of dollars ($USD) and represents the loss and/or premium placed on a given requirement.
The stakeholders of SCADA
To simplify the analysis, we consolidated the stakeholders into 4 categories:
• Maintenance personnel and operational personnel responsible for the maintenance and the performance of all system operations.
• System systems:
• 
The Depend (DP) Matrix
The dependency (DP presented in Table  populated by cyber operations and administrators according to how component contributes to meet requirement.
The components of system
To populate this matrix we used the provided via interviews with STEG:
• Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 
The Dependency (DP) Matrix
The dependency (DP) matrix presented in Table III is populated by cyber security operations and system administrators according to how each component contributes to meet each requirement.
The components of system
To populate this matrix we used the values provided via interviews with STEG:
• Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) • Communication (C)
The Impact Matrix (IM)
The impact matrix (IM) presented in TABLE IV is populated, through an interview process using subject matter experts (SME). Each cell contains the estimated probability that a component becomes compromised given that a threat has materialized. Naturally, the likelihood of a successful compromise depends on the resiliency of a given target. Though this dependency is not denoted separately in mathematical terms, the interview process is designed to take into account the condition (resiliency) of the target. In other words, the likelihood determination process should elicit and account for the existence of known vulnerabilities and other architectural features and/or dependencies that may cause coincident failure at the target. A coincident failure is when the target component is affected indirectly by other failed components. The SME must decide during an interview, for example, what is the likelihood that a DoS attack would affect a given target component including any residual effects from a DoS attack on neighboring coincident target components. Those residual effects can vary greatly depending on the type of attack method (strategy and tactics) for example attacks sourced by an intelligent human agent versus a malware agent (or some combination).
A SCADA system can be attacked by a large number of threats. For the STEG SCADA systems that were evaluated, the following categories of threats were considered:
• Malware (MV)
• Hardware vulnerability (HV)
• Communications vulnerability (CV)
The Threat Vector (PT)
The vector of threat probabilities is presented in Table V and was established empirically over the study period. Each cell gives the probability a given threat will emerge and are generally mapped to requirements based on the various encountered threats. This probability does not distinguish between successful/ unsuccessful compromise attempts, only emergence probability. P(T i ) is the probability that threat T i materialized within a unit of operation time (hour) and is accounted for within the various empirical perpetrator models designed to account for both observed and unobserved emergences. Factors such as known/unknown vulnerabilities and countermeasures are factored into the IM, not the PT.
Each cell represents the probability of realization of each threat, which depends on perpetrator models, empirical data, known vulnerabilities, and known counter-measures. P(T i ): The probability that threat T i materialized within a unit of operation time (in this case, one hour of operation). can vary greatly depending on the type of attack method (strategy and tactics) for example attacks sourced by an intelligent human agent versus a malware agent (or some combination).
A SCADA system can be attacked by a large number of threats. For the STEG SCADA systems that were evaluated, the following categories of threats were considered: 
The vector of threat probabilities is presented in Table 5 and was established empirically over the study period. Each cell gives the probability a given threat will emerge and are generally mapped to requirements based on the various encountered threats. This probability does not distinguish between successful/unsuccessful compromise attempts, only emergence probability. P(T i ) is the probability that threat T i materialized within a unit of operation time (hour) and is accounted for within the various empirical perpetrator models designed to account for both observed and unobserved emergences. Factors such as known/unknown vulnerabilities and countermeasures are factored into the IM, not the PT.
Each cell represents the probability of realization of each threat, which depends on perpetrator models, empirical data, known vulnerabilities, and known counter-measures. P(T i ): The probability that threat T i materialized within a unit of operation time (in this case, one hour of operation).
The Mean Failure Cost of the STEG SCADA Enterprise
The vector of mean failure costs is calculated using the stake matrix, dependency matrix; the impact matrix and the threat vector each stakeholder of STEG SCADA system using the formula explained in Section IV formula (2) . The results of the mean failure cost for each stakeholder are presented in Table 6 (Column: Initial MFC).
MFC AS A MEASURE OF AVAILABILITY
The classification of availability is somewhat flexible and is largely based on the type of downtime used in the computation and on the relationship with time (i.e. the span of time to which the availability refers). A wide range of availability classifications and definitions exist: One popular class is instantaneous (or point) availability, which is the probability that a system (or component) will be operational (up and running) at a specific time, t. However, let us consider average uptime availability. If the system if functioning properly from time 0 to t (i.e. it never failed by time t), then the probability of this happening is R(t), the instantaneous reliability at time t.
The mean availability is the proportion of time during a mission or time period that the system is available for use. It represents the mean value of the instantaneous availability function over the period (0, T) and is given by: where, the system functioned properly since the last repair at time u, 0 < u < t [48] . For systems that have periodical maintenance, availability may be zero at regular periodical intervals. In this case, mean availability is a more meaningful measure than instantaneous availability. This definition of availability is commonly used in manufacturing and telecommunication systems as it considers both reliability (probability that the item will not fail) and maintainability (the probability that the item is successfully restored after failure).
Still, an additional metric is needed to know the probability that the component/system is operational at a given time, (i.e., has not failed or it has been restored after failure). This metric is availability. Availability can be addressed as inherent (steady state when considering only the corrective downtown of the system), achieved (similar to inherent availability with the exception that preventive maintenance downtimes are included), or operational (a measure of the average availability over a period of time and it includes all experienced sources of downtime, such as administrative downtime, logistic downtime, etc.) [48] . Thus, availability is a performance criterion for repairable systems that accounts for both the reliability and maintainability properties of a component or system. To summarize, availability measures the amount of time a system or component performs its specified function. Availability is related to reliability, but different. Reliability measures how frequently the system fails; availability measures the percentage of time the system is in its operational state taking into account all factors that affect downtime (both scheduled and non-scheduled).
We adopt the following calculation as it satisfies a global perspective of the STEG SCADA system. AVAIL Op is the operational availability (4) is the ratio of the system uptime and total time. Mathematically, it is given by:
where, the operating cycle is the overall time period of operation being investigated and uptime is the total time the system was functioning during the operating cycle. The assumptions for determining availability have weaknesses:
-Independence with respect stakeholders -Independence of the components, which have failed to ensure availability -Independence of threats, which have caused the unavailability Given these weaknesses, we propose to derive a new measure of availability through the MFC. We compare the advantages of this new formulation to the original MFC formula. MFC is a formulation generally used to determine the cost (to affected stakeholders) or a security violation (or other such failure) of the system under study. Here, we extended MFC to describe a single attribute of dependability, namely the mean failure cost of availability. First, we suppose that availability is decomposable and we consider that the MFC has the same definition and is presented by the following formula (5):
where, ST' is nxl; DP' is lxh; IM is hxp; and PT is px1. We consider a system A, where S 1 , S 2 , S 3 . . . S k are the stakeholders and C 1 , C 2 , C 3 . . . C k are the system components as above (Section IV) with operational availability AVAIL Op as the sole criteria.
-ST' is an extension of the Stakes Matrix defined for MFC, where we consider the availability requirement as the only column vector in Table  2 . ST' represents the stake of stakeholder Si for availability attribute.
-DP' is an extension of the Dependency Matrix, in which we consider the availability as a row vector (i.e., the availability row from Table 3 ).
-DP' represents the set of probabilities for which a failed component, Ck will cause a violation of the availability requirement. The last column represents the case when no failure occurs (i.e., probability System A will be availability) as shown in the Availability row from Table 3 .
The resulting vector of mean failure costs is now calculated using the updated Stakes Matrix (ST'), updated Dependency Matrix (DP'), the original Impact Matrix (IM) and the original Probability Threat (PT) vector for each STEG SCADA system stakeholder category using formula (5) . The results are presented in Table 6 showing the MFC/stakeholder due to unavailability.
Application of MFC with emphasis on Availability
Availability of a system is defined as the ratio of up overt the total operating cycle as in (4) that the system is operational. If we want to redefine availability in value-oriented terms, we must consider three factors: -The gain, per unit of time, is realized by stakeholder S from the system being operational; we denote this by G(S). If we consider the STEG enterprise (i.e., the utility) and let S be the utility, then G(S) represents the average revenue stream per unit of operational time.
-The G(S i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 G(S i ) (see Table 7 column labeled "Gain") is provided as data from interviews made with the STEG SMEs.
-The loss, per unit of time, incurred by stakeholder S i from the system being down; we denote this by MFC(S i ). If we consider the STEG enterprise and let S be the utility company, then MFC(S i ) represents lost business, productivity and customer loyalty caused by downtime.
-AVAILop: The availability value defined in (4).
Using this concept of AVAIL and MFC, we define a value-oriented version of AVAIL namely, Econometric Availability (EA) presented by the following formula (6):
We applied the new formula (5) using the STEG's SCADA system. The data was collected from a year-long study that interviewed STEG stakeholders and SME's by the Universit de Tunis. The data was analyzed and the ST', DP', IM, and PT matrices were populated. The MFC was then calculated following formula (5) for the four primary stakeholders in Table VI and Table 7 . The mean time between failures (MTBF) was 182.5 hours. From historical records during the one-year period, the maintenance teams required, on average, 3 hours to repair the system (MTTR) including both administrative and logistic downtime. Applying the classic formula (4), the operational availability AVAIL Op is 98.38% (182.5 hours/(182.5 hours + 3 hours)).
The classical formula of availability is inadequate to determine whether the system is profitable or not. Let us recall that the ratio AVAIL Op , operational availability, has a value in [0, 1]. Therefore, if:
-AVAIL=1: the percentage of availability of the system is 100% (high level of availability).
-AVAIL=0: The system is unavailable (unacceptable)
-0<AVAIL<1: the system is not guaranteed to be available. In all three of these cases the value of AVAIL does not provide us with a definitive understanding about system profitability. To make the availability more useful in value-oriented terms, we have used the EA formulation (6) . Table 7 shows the MFC, Gain and EA for the selected stakeholders with the actual AVAIL of 98.4% and hypothetical values of 93%, 90%, and 75% respectively. These actual and synthetic values illustrate where: (1) the system is available and profitable (i.e., positive dollar values; all stakeholders at values of 98.4% availability, and only for system admins and controllers at values of 93% and 90% availability), and (3) the system is available and not profitable (i.e., negative dollar values for maintenance personnel and technical staff at values of 93% and 90% availability, and all stakeholders at value of 75% availability).
The new formula Econometric Availability (EA) can be used to evaluate the availability of a system in terms of the gain/loss ($/hour of operation) that each stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of availability breakdowns. If: -EA(S i ) = G(S i ): System is available with an average of 100% gain per unit of time.
-EA(S i ) = -MFC(S i ): System is unavailable and the MFC(S) is the average loss per unit of time.
-(1-AVAIL)×MFC(S i ) < EA(S i ) < 0: System is available but not profitable.
AVAIL×G(S i ) > EA(S i ) > 0: System is available and profitable.
Conclusion
In the STEG SCADA system, all selected stakeholders are profitable. However, this may not always be true. In the current set of data, if we had chosen other stakeholders, whose MFC and Gain parameters were marginal, and AVAIL was approximately ≥ 15% less resulting in the values 93%, 90% or 75% as shown in Table 7 , we see a situation where those stakeholders incurring such a failure causing unavailability becoming unprofitable.
SCADA systems used in critical infrastructures are characterized by interdependencies (physical, cyber, geographic and logical) and complexity (collections of interacting components). The critical nature and the high cost of failures causing unavailability make EA an important metric to ascertain. The classical formula based on time between failure and time to recovery does not adequately convey the stakes (profitability). In the future, we plan to experiment with the AVAIL parameter to investigate the sensitivity of the EA formula (6) assuming that MFC and the Gains are fixed by the characteristics of the system.
